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Introduction
fble paper la an exposition of George Berkeley1s
theory of space and extension based upon an examin
ation of the Oommonplaee Book (written in 1705-8),
an essay Of Infinites {written olr* 1706}, Jin .ffsaaff,
towards .a Hew theory. of vision {first published in
1709)0 A tgreatla,a„ Congemim the Principles of Human
Knowledge {first published .in 1710), Be Moth (first
published in 1721)# and Siria (first published In
n
1744)*
fhe strictly mathematical works are omitted
In accordance with the emphasis of this discussion*
Wo specific reference to fhrae Dialogues between
Evlaa .and PMlonoua is included, since the works
discussed Incorporate all the pertinent material
found in this popularisation of Berkeley*s theory*
Although most of Berkeley's ideas -concerning
space and extension are mentioned in the Common
place Book* certain of them are given particular
attention in one or more of the other writings#
fhe result is sometimes confusing, since Berkeley,
in order to bring home some particular point, may
neglect to explain its full bBpfieations#

All references are to Fraser*e edition of Berkeley's
Works (Oxford, 1901), 4 vols* by volume and page#

2

For example, the purpose of the Theory of Vision
is *«.*«»to shew to whet maimer we perceive by Sight
the Distance,, Magnitude, and Situation of objects* **
But Berkeley also uses the Theory of Vision as a
gentle introduction to 'the theory that the objects
of knowledge are simply ideas to the mind and have
no existence external to it*.
This produces some awkwardness, since Berkeley
attempts- to show that vision had no external object
but speaks continually to this assay as though
knowledge of an external object were given through
the sense of touch, even though It is apparent that
the argument# urged against the existence of an
external visual object might be applied with equal
force against the existence of an external tactual
object#
This ambiguity is excused to the Principles
on the ground that the Theory of Vision deals with
vision only and that clarity and simplicity of
presentation -demand that a discussion of external
tactual objects be omitted to that p l a c e A p p a r e n t l y
Berkeley thought it better to present his theory of

2I. 12V.
31

,280.

idealism a little at a time in order to insure for
it a better reception#

Hemsrks in the Qomonplaee

Book indicate that he was careful to leave certain
things unsaid for fear of prejudicing the reader
against future writings*

The discrepancy mentioned

does not proceed, then, from a modification of ideas
but merely from the mode of presentation*
This paper attempts to present Berkeley1 a mature
views on space and extension, avoiding, such ambiguities
as that mentioned*

C o n & eq iien tly it seems better to

bring the ideas in the different works together into
a coherent unit rather than to adhere to a strictly
chronological treatment*

In fact # basically there

seems to have been little development ih Berkeley *a
space theory after the Commonplace Book, since all
of the essential points are stated there from sub
stantially the same viewpoint found in later works*
An exception to this is the short treatment of the
relation of Bod and apace in Birds*

Consequently

I have dealt with this material to a separate section*
The major questions to be discussed are: Cl) Are
there external apace and extension existing independ
ently of.mindsf

(2 ) Are there such things as abstract

4
space and extension? (3) Is there such a thing, as
absolute apace or is space relative? 14) What Is the
character of mathematical space?
fhe topical summary will serve as'a more com*
pieto outline*
throughout this paper the tern ^extension” will
mean the particular extension of physical objects*
0 pace

will mean pure* absolute space in Itself*

what Berkeley sometimes refers to. as ^expansion1**
unless otherwise specified*

Space will be diatin*

guiahed further into absolute* Infinite apace*
meaning pure space In Itself* and relative or finite
space* which exists between particular things and
which is measured by or occupied by them*

s

T he Character of Qualities and Matter to General

Berkeley1a refutation of the existence of
absolute and external space and extension rests
■partly on the general disproof of the existence of
external, bodies.*

Consequently it is necessary to

say something about ideas and qualities to general
before going on to discuss the special questions
of space and extension*
(a)

Spirits -and Ideas

Berkeley distinguishes spirits and idea©-as
the only things which exist* . Spirits are to be
considered as “active* indivisible incorruptible
substancesw*

Being simple and one they -are the

only cause of things* because they alone are active*.
“Spirit as it pereelves is called the understanding
and as it produces or otherwise operates on ideas
is called the willn *2

Consequently it* rather than

ideas, which can cause nothing Is the true cause of
all things*

3

“Ideas are inert perishable passions

or dependent beings* which subsist not by themselves
but are supported by , or exist to, minds or spiritual

1I. 307.
2I. 272.
SX. 270, 275, 314.

6
4
substances1**

Motion, like all other ideas, is
jKjj
properly inert so ttto endeavour to- explain tlx©
produotion o f colors by figure, motion, or-mag*
nltnd© is to labour in vaintf»®

Sine© spirit and

•ideas are the only things that exist, the die*tinction between substance and mode is nnintelli*
gSble*

7

Qualities could not be modes of spirit be*

cause, for example, extension la an idea existing
only' in spirit|-and consequently, spirit could not..
©
have extension .as an attribute or mode;*
(b) Primary Qualities are in the Mind.
In the Principles Berkeley attempts to show
that primary, as well as secondary , qualities
exist only In the mind#

From this it follows that,

since all qualities are Ideas in the mind- and since
physical objects are simply groups of qualities,
physical objects exist -only in the mind,

this la

important, since on© argument for the existence of
*

'

!

4I* 307,
5I, 071-2,
6I. 314,
1. 284,
8

•

1. 285,

7

absolute* external space la that it is necessary as a
place for the existence and motion of bodies which are
assumed to exist independentIf of mind and external to it*
Disprove the externality of physical objects, and
their motion and the necessity for .an external' space
la' removed together with objective extension#
$he principal arguments presented are the fol
lowing :
Cl) Extension* figure* and motion abstracted

from all other qualities- are unimaginable*

Every idea

of an extended body is associated with some color
or some other sense quality- which is acknowledged to

exist- only in .the mind, and where the color is, there
also must be* the extension and the, other primary
qualities*^
(2 ) Every argument used to show that color and
the other secondary qualities do not exist in an.
external object may be applied to extension, figure,
. * »>«o» “

«w . . ^

- 1

e

« . rel-

ativlty of sense perception may be used equally well
to* disprove the externality of primary qualities*
For example, ”♦♦**«/great and small, swift and alow
nrr-T.-r J-T.—m r f "rni

0

—n r nciiirii. r - n ^ ir a ^ r ; - r r f r tr Vi r r . iln nrun- --------------------------------------------- -- --------------- ------r -^tirf

1* 263*

10I. 59, 265-6,

r- r r - r r r

r-~—^r.rr-—

>■ !■-■■ ■" ■■

are allowed to exist nowhere without' the mind| being*'*

'

*r *

¥
•

entirely relative .and changing as the frame or position
of .the organa of sens© varies*

fhe extension therefore

which exists without the mind is neither great nor small,
..........that Is,.*.,,nothing at all".*1
fheae arguments do not show that extension and
color do not exist in an external object hut simply
that we do not know by our senses which appearance
*

of an object is its true one*
is) .toother argument shows that it is impossible
for any sensible quality to exist outside the mind*3,2
to idea is defined as wany sensible or Imaginable
^ 13
thing**
£ 1 1 sensible qualities are alike sensations
and alike real and, being Ideas, can exist only in
M
’
7
the'Bind*'
therefore color, figure, extension, and
-

all other qualities, whether primary or secondary ,
are equally in the mind,*

l:LI. 263*
265.
13I. 47.
14I. 512,
15X. 262,

9

(c) Bo %ternal Objects or ^latter1*'
Pilose who assume that qualities are external
to the mind commonly suppose the® to exist to an
external ^matter11 of which they are the properties#
Berkeley specifically attacks the notion of such an
external matter to the abstract apart from sensible
appearances and shows that, since external objects do
not exist, there Is no reason for supposing the
existence of external qualities*

toe arguments are

the following i
(1 ) If there were external objects we could
know of 'them only through either sense or reason*
•;

*

•
.\ •

But sense gives us knowledge

ofonly sensations

or

those things that .are ’immediately present to the
senses and does not inform us that things exist
outside the mind*

tod we can not reason out the

externality of bodies since even the advocates of
that view admit that there is no necessary connection
ig
between ideas and-externalthings*
Moreover, if
.

.

.

there were external bodies we could never know of
*

them, for a person affected with cdrtate ideas but
not from, an external body would have as much reason
16 *
I* 268*

10

to believe the ideas proceeded from an external
body as a parson who actually received similar
Ideas fr o m a body that really existed external
to him*^
( 2 ) The absolute existence of sensible objects

in themselves or independent and outside of the
mind is either meaningless or else a direct con18
tradletton*
We have no positive idea of a sub*
stratum supporting extension or any other quality and
consequently we can not speak meaningfully of such a
19
substratum#
Moreover* all ideas are "visibly in*
active"*

Their very nature implies passivity and

it is impossible for an idea to do anything or*
strictly speaking* to cause anything* nor can it
go
resemble an active being#' How matter can operate
on spirit no philosopher can explain. 2 1

Hone© object-

ive extension# figure# and motion can not be the cause
of our sensations*

To say that they are the effect

of powers resulting fro®- "the configuration# number#
27
I* 268*
18I. 270.
19

I. 268, 295*

20I. 270-1.
glI. 285.

11

motion, and also of corpuscles* {as book© suggests)
must be false, for figure, extension, and motion,are
ideas and exist In the mind only*

22

(d) fh© £rue Object of Bens©
Since be has attacked the notion of external
bodies, Berkeley is confronted with the question
of the true nature of the objects of sense*

B©

concludes that a sensory object Is nothing but the
combination of such sensations as color, etc*, non©
of which can be supposed to exist unperceived*83
All that really is contained in the idea ^matter*
are the positive ideas of extension, figure, solid**
ity, and motion*

fhere is no underlying substrate

nor need there be, for it la no more absurd to sup
pose accidents without a substance than to- suppose
24
substance without.accidents*
Matter la only a
group of Ideas in the mind*

fher© is no inert, ex

tended matter out aid© of the mind*
25
matter that is unpercelvefele*
22

i* 2 6 2 , am*
23
X* 313*
24I» 295.
25I. 295-6.
\

T h e v e is no

12
Since the objects of sense ar e in the mind,
it is unnecessary to assume the existence of
an external space as their locus#

furthermore 9

h j the same reasoning! there is no necessity for

external extension#

External extension assumes the

existence of external matter#
and hence the former is also*

P6

1* 208t 300*

Hie latter is false
26

23

Ho External Space or Extension
M s

section deals with Berkeley la specific

denial of the externality of extension in particular*
fhe attack upon the external existence of qualities
and matter .includes -in general form most of the
arguments which follow*

Ihose arguments as directed

particularly against the externality of extension
appear In the Ooimnonplaee Book 4 where Berkeley was
formulating- his metaphysics#

It seems reasonable

that the general attack on external primary qualities
was prompted by* and was an outgrowth of, the con
sideration of extension*

Berkeley had to dispose of

the Cartesian belief in matter as that which is ex
tended sine© extension was probably the quality that
would be held most 'tenaciously to exist outside the
1

mind# '
(a)

Arguments Against External Extension

In the Commonplace Book Berkeley is already
certain that no extension, either risible or tan
gible, exists outside the mind, although the Iheory
of Vigiqa appears to ddny externality to visual

I. ,50.

14

extension alone#

M previously suggested,, this ap

parent discrepancy arises from Berkeley’s technique
of presentation rather than from, any change in
his theory#
Extension may be said to be ,!outsideff the
mind only in a special sense, that is. In ao far
as it is Independent of the will or is distinct from
the mind*

While it may be independent of a particular

human will, however, it must, being an idea, be de
pendent upon some will or mind, although it is no
property of mind, since mind can exist without it.

2

People imagine extension to be an inert property
o f unthinking substance and not in. the mind because
3

It is not accompanied, by pleasure or pain,

because

it is perceived in common by two senses, and be4,
cause of ignorance of the laws of optics* ~ But ex
tension can not exist outside the mind for a variety
5
of reasonss
\

(1 ) The existence of extension outside the

Z

i* m *

*SL

It 31*
4
It 6 2 .
5
I* 57*

15

mind implies the contradictory notion that that
which Is known may ho a property of the unknown^
It is argued that the idea of extension is not in
an mthlhking matter hut that it is like something
in that matter*

But one can not imagine what that

something would he#
a self-contradiction#

An unperceived perception is
7

(2) Extension is a sensation and therefore must
he in the mind#

If ..there were a solid# extended

substance the mind -would-not and could not he
acquainted with it for it perceives V# *#only the
impressions made upon its brain# or rather the ideas
« 8

attending these impressions *■
{3) Extension can not be conceived without
tangible or visible qualities and so must be in the
mind where those qualities are#

Berkeley refers to

this as the "chief argument" against external ex**'
tension.9
(4) Another argument apparently aimed particularly
at the Cartesian notion of extension as the defining
6

X# 80#

7I* 8S-3.
A

X* 63.

9X. 81.

property of matter occurs in the Principles*

1^

there is an external matter which is infinitely
divisible^. as science claims,, then each body is
infinitely extended and void of all shape and
figure and each particle of matter is infinite and
shapeless*

This" is absurd and self-contradictory,

ao it must he that the mind ^frames all that
»

variety of bodies which compos© the visible world,
anyone whereof does not exist longer than it is

10

perceived** ' Consequently matter considered in the
usual scientific sense could not exist outside the
mind and It Is useless to suppose extension to be
external*
Berkeley has little to say directly about
the IntemaXity of space*

This is because, as will

be shown, later, the only space he recognises is
space as relative to extended objects*

IxtemaX

space, then, would be disproved by the disproof of
external extension*

This question will be considered

further in the discussion of the perception of
space based on the Theory.of Vision*

However, the

Commonplace Book presents the argument that there could
10

I* 285*

be no space outside the mind* since space is an idea
in the mind and without the mind there would he
11
uniform nothing, '■

(b)

Arguments Against Abstract Extension

Several arguments against the existence of
an abstract general idea of extension are stated
in the QarmonttlBCB Book,

Here* as elsewhere*

M

.

r

Berkeley insists that' there are no abstract ideas
of any .kind* but the notes which constitute this
work indicate a preoccupation with extension#
the ,fgreat argument** is that extension can
not be imagined abstracted from sensible qualities
tg
such as those of touch and vision#11We can no more
have an idea of length without'breadth or visibility
14
than of a general figure**"
lockets ^general
*

triangle* is shown in the Brinelnles to be no ■true

idea on the same ground **- that when we consult ex
perience we find that we have no abstract idea of
IS
extension*
Extension considered in the abstract
11

1* 65*
IS
I. 7.
1SI, 10, 81.
14X# X t»

151. 38, 246.

represent a no idea and is merely a word#'
3?here is a great' difference between considering
length without breadth and haring an idea of it or
imagining it*^

lines and points conceived as ter**

minations are different from lines and points con**
is
eelved 11absolutelyn$
for terminations of surfaces,
#* 19
that iSj figures., *are not imaginable per se »
*

Extension is not conceived in itself apart fram
other sensible qualities, because a. mere line not
made up of points can not be imagined and hence does
not exist.20 Moreover, everything perceived Is a
particular and extension can not be separated or
abstracted from particular things#
#■

T h e T he cry of Vision reiterates the argument

that a line devoid of sensible qualities is un~
imaginable and shows that a general extension, such
as a general triangle la a contradiction since it
must be at once large and small, oblique■and

10

rectangular# etc**

2%

fixe arguments just stated depend chiefly
upon the nntoaginabllity of general extension
hut- contain certain rational elements! as in the
argument concerning the general triangle#

Hot

only are we unable to imagine abstract extension
but we are even unable to conceive it*

Abstract**

ing extension brings us into "extravagances* and
.paradoxes such as n* #**that the fire is not hot#
22
n o r the wall white***#11*

T h e f a u l t lies in a two**.

fold errors
Cl) fhe supposition that extension (or any

other quality) may be abstracted from all sen*
sible qualities*
{B ) fhe supposition that the entity extension
23
can be abstracted from its being perceived.#'
(c)

Criticism of the "Great Argument11

Berkeley has referred several times to the
"great argument" against extension being outside
the -mini*

fhts argument may be taken in two parts

which are respectively rational and empiric all

21I. 187-9,
22 _

X. 312#
23t
<5
A.* vMUS*

20

(X) It .has been stated that the only things
which exist are active■spirits and passive ideas$
the latter, by their very nature, capable of
existing only in mlnda or spirits,

therefore,

extension, not being a spirit, must exist in the
mind#

tThat it should exist elsewhere is rationally

inconceivable,
3h my opinion this argument fails to show that
nothing can exist except spirits and ideas*

^hat we

can conceive of nothing -else does not bar the exist
ence of something else#

Even if we agree that Mosse

est int0 lligin the argument is unsatisfactory,
Berkeley assumes that a division of things into £bat
which thinks and that which is thought of is
exhaustive of the universe#
fallacy#

04

This is a serious

fhe disjunction should be between things

thought of and things not thought of or between
tilings which think and things which do not think*
It seems to be Berkeley*s .intention to apply the
second disjunction, but, if so, what objection
could there be to thinking of something that thinks?
We might even apply the criterion of reality to
24- '

I, 10,

21

minds and say t h a t a mind, is real if it is thought
of*

(2 )

But Berkeley tries to establish M s point

by an empirical trial*

Me defines reality or

existence, as being perceived#

<r>er

wThe existence of

oar ideas consists in being perceived* imagined*
thought o n n%®9

Hence* if the idea of extension

is not perceived* then extension does not exist*
tEhat is* it must h e perceived -by some mind in order
for it to be real*

Reasoning about things of which

we have no idea is both absurd and impossible*^
Examination of our ideas will convince us that we
have

idea of either external or abstract ex

tension#
in summary then* since external extension
is not perceived and can not be logically conceived
h y the human mind* it has no existence or reality*

But so far it is still possible that other minds
than ours might be able to entertain an idea of
abstract.extension which would be external to our minds*
g 5 -r

X#
26fi1*
*

^
10*
m1"
Xo#

(c) C&i&eyia of Heality
2 have stated that pare ©inability is ^ e r k e l o y *s
criterion of the reality of ideas 3 but other defin
itions- of reality are given*

In the Principles

ideas printed on t h e m in d by God are called real* ^
Still another meaning is given to reality - that of
vividness*

Ideas of sense are said to be more strong*

lively* and distinct than those of Imagination and
have a distinctive steadiness and order*

”tS?hey are

allowed 'to have more reality in thorn - that is* to
be more strong* lively* and coherent than creatures
of the rated* but this is no argument that they erist
##

outside the mind1* "

Several possible criteria* then*

present themselves I
Cl) Being perceived,
(2) Production from a source outside the human
mind*
(3) Clarity* strength* liveliness* and steadiness#
(4) Coherence with other ideas*
To these may be added logical conceivability unless

coherence is taken, to me an this#

23
Berkeley appears to consider perception to
be the true test for the reality of things, hut,
aa we have seen, -an idea May he rejected as non
existent because it ia logically inconceivable*
To be is to be understood as well as to be per
ceived*

Berkeley does not enforce this distinction

as consistently as could he desired and frequently
even uses the t © m ^conceive11 when he obviously
means ^perceive1**

In any case we can not recon

cile either criterion with the notion that there
are degrees of reality and will not take the other
criteria suggested seriously*
So far Berkeley has been denying the existence
of external matter and external space and extension
on the ground that they are neither conceived nor
perceived by the human mind*

But to say that these

■entities are beyond human knowledge is not to say
that they have existence in no mind whatsoever*
The possibility of such existence will be discussed
in another part of this paper*

m

Absolute Space
toe existence of absolute apace might he
urged as a place for absolute motion*

If there

la -absolute motion there must be absolute apace*
Berkeleyfs discussion of the perception of space
in the toeory of vision shows that we only know
relative space*

However, he spends considerable

time on a direct attack on the notions of absolute
space and absolute motion*
la) Kewton’s Space and Motion
lewton $ of course was the chief scientific
authority of the time so Berkeley turns to
Principle and finds that?
**** ime, Space* and Motion are distinguished
iuto absolute and relative. true and apparent*
mathematical and vulgar £ which distinct ion* *»* *
does'suppose those "qualities to have an
existence without the minds -and that they
are ordinarily conceived with relation to
sensible things* to which nevertheless to
their* own nature, they bear no' relation at
all11*
lewton* according to Berkeley, also states that?
(I)*?** there is an absolute Space, which, being
unperceivable to the sense.' reratos in itself
similar and immoveablej .and relative Space tobe the measure thereof, which* being moveable

XI. 319,

26

and defined by its situation in respect of

sensible bodies, 1$ taken vulgarly for
immoveable space**#*
{gl^Absolute Motion is said to be the translation
of a b o % from absolute place to absolute
place, as reiativej&obion is from one relative
place' to another11#0
(3}wihi& because the parts of absolute space do
not fall under our' senses, instead of them
we are obliged to use .their sensible'measures!
and so define both place and motion with
respect to bodies which are regarded as
.
immoveable'**.#
Cb) Ho Absolute Motion

In the Commonplace Book Berkeley is already
speculating how to reconcile Hewton* s two types
s
of motion with his c m doctrine?
Here he points
out that even if the. existence of external bodies
is assumed,; it is still impossible for us to know
that any body is absolutely at rest or in motion,
*since that supposing ideas much slower than at
present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be
apparently at rest",6

®I. 319.
3I. 319. *
4I. 319.
5I. 60.
61. 60-1,

26

Hie m ove pertinent arguments appear in the
Principles.^ where it is held that there- can he no
absolute motion*. because we have no idea of it
and can not conceive of its
(1) Inhere can be only relative motion since
two bodies are necessary for there to be any motion
at all#

"This seems evident* in that the idea 1
ry

have of motion doth necessarily include relation*15
An examination of the ideas present to our minds

shows that no one conceives motion differently*
(2) But when two bodies com© nearer together
it is possible that only one is in motion since
that one moves which has had force impressed upon
it*

^Motion Includes a relation of one thing to

another yet it is not necessary that each term of
the relation be denominated from it*
{3) T,As the place happens to be variously
defined* the motion which is related to
it varies* A man to a ship may be said
to be quiescent with relation to the
aides of the vessel* yet move with relation
to the land*11

7I, 320*
8I. 320.
9
I* 321.

m

We find on examination that wo have no real
idea of absolute motion hut only oho of relative
motion with -the utmost walls* of a finite 'universe
as fixed points of reference.

At least from a human

..point of view, absolute motion is Incomprehensible*.

10

Berkeley aeems to have made difficulty for
himself in adopting the' assertion of Mewton that
for-a body to be moved two tilings are necessary s
first, change in distance with regard to another
body, and,, second, that the force occasioning the
11
change be applied to it#
taking this view Berkeley
is able to say that a lone body with vis,impreaaa
would not have motion unless other bodies were pro*
sent to define the position#^
fro objections to this are -'apparent#

first,

it is obvious that- we would be unable to tell by
observation which of two bodies was in motion, that
is, which had vie Imnreaaa*
cept which implies motion*

Second, force is a con
Force, in Berkeley's

system, can only have meaning as it refers to sen
sible effects which are exhibited and observed in
motion#
10

X* 321.
11 *£Oll
mm O&Jbm
*®I, 322*

*

2B

Force is only definable to terms of motion* either
absolute or relative, and could not he impressed upon
a body without producing motion* or* at any1rate*
could not he known to he impressed upon a “
body (which
for Berkeley is the same thing) without motion being
present end known*
fc) Hewtonto Ikpirieai Proof of Absolute Motion^
Wewtoato Principle presents an. empirical proof
for absolute motion and Berkeley refutes this to
the QtamonpiaOe Bookf to the Principles > and at
greater length to Be Motu»- toe proof consists to
an experiment to which a bucket of water is suspended
from a rope which has been twisted so that the bucket
will rotate when released*

Before the bucket% is
*

released the water is at rest to relation to It*
After it has been released the bucket revolves and
the water is to motion to relation to it*

But

after some time the water begins to rotate at the
same speed as the bucket and is at rest to relation
IS
Hewtonts discussion appears to the Scholium to
Definition W11X' of Brineipla ^thematlcar" fOTmrr

to It*

However* the surface of the water has assumed

ah angle from the center* and this -angle*. Hewton holds*
is ah Indieation of the absolute motion of the water*
Berkeley shows that the creation of the vortex
may as well be interpreted in terns of relative motion
as in terms of absolute motion even though the water
and the bucket are at rest in relation, to one another*
for other points of reference such as the earth must
. 14
be- considered*
<&) Bo Absolute Space
Berkeley concludes his argument by stating
that the philosophic consideration of motion does
not imply the existence of an absolute space distinct
from, that which is perceived by the sense and related
to bodies| and that it is clear such a space can
not exist outside the mind on the same arguments
used to deny the externality of other objects of
sense*

Moreover* ^motion is proportional to

space described in a given time
relative*
14

Motion* therefore* would be doubly relative*.

I* 12 * 321**2* D*M* sec* 3G***64*

1SI. 67.

and time is

30

fhus# Is©causa w© do not and can not naira .ait Idea
of absolute motion* it is unnecessary to assume
the existence of absolute space* of which we ©an. have
;

idea*.
{©) Mo Abstract Idea of Space
Just as we haire no abstract Idea of extension
so we can not frame the idea of pure -space ©xclusire of all body* for this is a most abstract idea*

10

Attempts to abstract pure space lead to- difficulties
and contradictions* whereas particular finite apace
and place are readily Intelligible*
"Bid your servant meet you at such a time*
in such a- place and he shall never stay to
deliberate on the meaning of these words***#.
But It will gravel a philosopher to Imow
what is meant by time In the abstract##*”
What is said here of time is equally applicable
to space*
We have:/ then* no idea of pure space*

Our

M e n of' empty space is "the sensuous idea of
'unresisted motion1*
' dependent upon the sensations
of the limbs (the..kinesthetic sense)*
ie T *20^ ■
JL« 0*50#
17

I* 311#

If these

31

sensations were absent there would be no idea
IS
of empty space# ‘ Aa will be shown in the discussion
'of space based oh the'''Theory of,Vision. the ideas of
■space are not got from seeing but from touch and the
10
muscle sense* ' It should be noted that the idea
of empty apace- is dependent cm motion* the sensuous
idea of unresisted motion, which is a relative idea*
Hence the idea of empty apace is also relative*

But

we, have no idea, of space- abstracted from sensuous'
<gualltfee*

18
I* 383*
19I. 323.

How We Ferceive Space and Extension
fhe talk of the Wheory of Vision deale with
the problem of how apace and extension are per
ceived and at the same time suggests certain
ideas concerning the nature- of these entities:#;
In summarising this discussion it Is practically
impossible to separate the philosophical from the

CaJ Distance

begins with the assumption that
^outness*1 or distance from the point of vision
Is not seen Immediately*

-Such distance, ^heing

a line endwise to the eye, it projects only one
point to the fund of the eye* which point remains
invariably the same, whether the distance be longer
or shorter# ^

fills is generally accepted for

far objects, whose distance is conceded to be known
only by experience which makes use of such cues as
o
aerial perspective and intervening objects#

H ,

127.

2x* ie a .

S3

Hear distance* however* is generally held
to he i m o m by noting the necessary connection
between the angle of the optic axis and the die**'
tanee or outness of the object* or else by the
#X

greater or leas divergence of the rays on the ©ye*
Berkeley denies that either of these is true*
Heither the distance nor the optic angle is seen
4
directly , and an idea which is not perceived can
■e

not bring another Idea into the mind*

Moreover*

lines and angles of vision are hypothetical and
unknown, to the common man or to children* who
nevertheless can make sudden judgments of distance
6
with sufficient accuracy*,
Even if lines and angles
of vision had a real existence and the mind could
perceive them directly * we could not judge distance
by using them* for a necessary connection does not
exist between them and distance*

5X. 129.

4X, 133.
5X. 129, 131, 133.
6I. 131, 134.
7I. 131.

7
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Since distance is suggested to the mind through
8
the mediation of some other idea or ideas f it is
necessary to examine what ideas attend.vision in
o
order to find out .what ideas suggest distance*
She ideas which attend the perception of -distance
are discovered to he first# convergence* the sensation
produced by the convergence of the pupils upon- the, .
object* and second* confusion#, Bear objects are
10
confused and -far objects are diftinet*
Confused
vision ia« produced when the rays do not unite on the
retinai^
knowledge of near distance through convergence
depends upon associations learned by experience^
and not upon -angles

nor upon a necessary connection

between convergence and distance#^

The sensation

which arises from the 'Msum of the eyes11 is Immediately

SX* 128-9*
0
1# 131#
10*< i3S*
*%, 143*
1-0T.. *1-W i® .
13 '
1* 33*
14I. 153.

pereeived* end various degrees of It are associated
with different distances*^

While angles are

■formed* w© do mot apply them to the interpretation
of convergence, he cause they are never seen end
16
conse(guontly can not be used*
Our knowledge
of distance drawn from the sensation of convergence
depends* then* not o n necessary connection but upon'
experience of constant associations-*

2J7

Similarly* knowledge of distance through
confusion of the image comes through association
18
rather than from a necessary connection*
To
prove this Berkeley notes that to a purblind
person a greater confusion suggesta a greater
distance because of the abnormal associations
19
furnished in repeated presentat ions*
One idea
suggests another when constantly attending- it*

20

Thus

we judge distance from confusion by learning that a

15I.
16
I.
17
I.
18
X*
iq

13E,
140*
133* 140*
_
lo4*

I* 143*

20- .

X* 134*

confused object may be seen distinctly by straining
the ©ye and the degree of strain necessary to produce
2%r

a distinct image gives us the distance* " The eon*
nectlon between confusion and nearness is learned
by their constant presentation together so that from
the presence of one we infer the other just as we
infer shame from seeing a blush*
That we see far objects as confused and near ones
as distinct when viewed by reflection from a speculum*
indicates only that the judgment is not made by
25
angles and lines but by arbitrary signs*
The mind
sees confusion and annexes to it a certain distance
regardless of the causes of the confusion* the dis*
tance taken depending on. past experience which*
according to Berkeley, was ignored by Barrow when
he set up this objection#
Wot only is there no necessary connection
between distance and convergence or confusion* but
also the "particular number * also* kind* etc*" of

21I. 134.
2S1, 66, 67, 134.
X* 141*
24I. 143-4

visible things which are need to contribute to frame
cot idea of distance #fhavc none of them, In their
own nature* any relation or connection%ith distance*

05

‘The only connection is that learned through experience#
A man b o m blind and suddenly made to see would

have no idea of distance* and all objects would be
simply new sensations as near to him as nhis passions
36
and the inmost thoughts of his mind**
For that matter* those who are not blind do
not necessarily think that what they see is outside
37
them or at -a distance* ' For color is in the mind
as everyone admits and* since the visual extension
appears as near as Its- color* and since motion
end figure are in the same place- as extension* then
what we see is not necessarily thought to be outside
28
110*

We never see the distance of visible things*
For example* X do not ever see the distance of the
visible moon for at mother distance the original

25I* 135.
S6I. 146.
p7
- 1* 38, 70, 85* 146*
I* 146*

38
appearance has vanished#

29

(b) How We Bee Distance
If we- never gee distance then hew do we
come to know 'the significance of visual cues?
Berkeley explains thati
^.Having of a Ions time experienced certain
Ideas perceiveable by touch - as distance *
tangible figure* and solidity *- to have
been connected with certain ideas of sight*
I do* upon perceiving these ideas of sight*
forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are*
by th© wonted course of nature, like to
follow."30
We -Interpret visual sensations In terns of the
tactual sensation© which we have learned accompany
them* for the ideas of space or outness are no
more the object of vision than of hearing*

By

variations in the noise made by the horses we
are able to tell the distance of a coach* Tot we
31
would not say that we hear the distance *
for
we are not apt to confuse Ideas of sound with those
32 . .
of touch*
But we -no more see and feel the same

29I. 147-8.
SO.I# 140
31
I** 149#
32I* 198*

m

thing than w© hear and feel the ©am© thing*

33

According' to Berkeley, then, w© do not see
distance hut we feel it directly#.

Obviously the

notion’that we feel the woutness1* ot objects by the
sense of touch is inconsistent with the theory that
all ideas are in the mind*

As previously suggested,

Berkeley1a reason for falling to show that the
tactual object la no more external than the visual
object is the fact that here, in uh© theory of Vision f
he is attempting, to show how we interpret visual
stimuli in terns of distance and does not wish to
complicate the issue by denying at the same time the
externality of the objects of touch*

Once one has been

shown that the visual object is in the mind he may
he led more easily to believe in the Intemallty of the
tactual object as well*
te) factual Distance Is Prior
Berkeley states that there- are two types of
object s apprehended by the eye, the one mediately
and the other Immediately*

SSI. 150*

fhe first type consists

40

of objects which are suggested by the eye but are
not seen since they are interpreted as of a tangible
character and at a tangible distance*

'fhe second type

of object is the purely visual appearance which "is
neither near nor far.34
there is only one ultimate source for our ideas'
of distance or outness, and that is the sens© of touch*
However, turning to a further analysis of space and
extension we find that there are two kinds of extern** •
sion because there are two sources,, that is, visible
and tangible ideas*

Visible -and tangible extension

are not the asm© thing, because we never see and feel
the asm© object*^

$&© confusion of' thinking that

the object' of the two is the, same arises because the
Combination of visible ideas goes by the same name
as the combination of tangible ideas*

Moreover,

secondary ^derivative1* ideas often affect us so
strongly that it is difficult to distinguish them from.
Immediate ideas*

lust as we seem to hear thoughts,

though we only do so mediately, so we seem to see
54

I. ISO*

(ZR *
^1* 150.

41

space though it is only through interpretatioxi* ^
factual space Is given priority then over visual
space*

When Berkeley says that we know tactual

distance or outness immediately*. he evidently refers
to the kinesthetic sensations produced by reaching.
out to touch an external object or by moving toward
/
it* But he fails to distinguish between tactual and
kinesthetic sensations* both of' which would be neces
sary to get an -idea of outness#

fhe tactual sense

alone would no more give direct knowledge-of-distance
than would the visual# .Xt is clear! moreover* that
tactual sensations could be interpreted in terms of
visual space Just as well as vice, versa#.

It is also

worth noting that if* with Berkeley* we admit that
the objects of sight and touch are different* then
the objects of touch differ from those of the kin
esthetic sense and* just as we never touch the same
object that we ace* so we never touch the object
toward which we move*
36_
1# 150-1#
S7I. 77.

42

{&) Distance Between feints
ta the foregoing discussion I have summarised
Berkeley1'© treatment of the perception of space
as outness or distance from the observer*

Distances

between objects which lie'in a line at right angles
to the optic sjtie are not discussed directly*
Such distances are said to consist of the number
*20

of points between two points#'

However, distances

of this sort, the space between objects, majr be
comprehended under the discussion of the perception.
' of magnitude*

fhe perception of these spaces presents

no problem not discussed under that head#
(©} Magnitude

Magnitude, like distance, is known neither through
the use of visual angles, for these are never seen,
tier through the use of angles 'in conjunction with
distance for distance is never seen -■ all things being
39

at an equal distance, visually# ' *he?e are two
sorts of magnitude, visual and tactual, composed

I* 11*
39
1* 7 2 , 7 4 , 1S2*

respectively of visual and tactual Ideas* ^

these

ideas are ^minima sensibil±a% the smallest thing that
can he perceived visually and the smallest that can be
perceived taetoually.41

From visual magnitude we can

determine tactual magnitude through the application, of
past experience, tactual magnitude being prior*

%

js#

when we apeak of magnitude we mean tactual or tangible
magnitude, for visual magnitude is always changing as
we draw near or move away and has n o f i x e d determinate
greatness*4^

Abstract magnitude, of course. Is never

known by virtue of the acme arguments as for abstract
space* 43
^
Berkeley shows how we can. infer tangible magnitude
from visible magnitude by noting what Introduces
the idea of greater or less into our thoughts when
we look at an object*.

Vision gives us several cue35

visible magnitude, degree of vigorousness or faintness,
degree of distinctness or confusion, the figure,
number, and situation of intermediate objects, and
40**..........

I* .152*

41X* 153*
■42

I* 153#
r

43I, 187-190*

the disposition of the eye ** in .short the seme cues
which permit us to judge distance %

vision*4^

We toow the magnitude of objects by vision
through the experienced association between these
cues and tangible' magnitude or 'bigness rather them.
<x%
*
through any necessary connection*.
A person b o m
blind and made to see would not be able to judge the
magnitude of objects by sight because he would ■not

have experienced the association of these cues*

<&0

fbna* tangible magnitude is inferred from vis-*
ible cues in the same way that we infer tangible
distancej, that is* through straining the eye* vivid-*'
ness* confusion*and the situation of visible points
as high or low in accordance with, whether they are

47

far or near* '

***,
45
X*
46
I.
47
I.

73, 3.33-4*
154-5*
73, 167*
165-6.

45
it)

Motion

We are apt to confuse visual with tangible motion,
but actually these have no common object and their
48
connection is known only through experience#
We
coordinate the signs of the two motions and determine
tangible sot ion from visible cues Just as we do with
49
magnitudes*.
Motion in the abstract is a fiction
50
in common with other abstractions#
Cg} Situation
Situation, like distance and motion, may be
known through visual experience interpreted tactually*

51

That objects reflected upside down on the retina are
seen right 'side up can be explained only if it la
assumed that visual' and tactual ideas‘are not directly
59
connected, " Moreover, one bora blind and made to see
would have to learn associations with tangible space
S3
by experience before knowing visual up and down*
i'i
Tirwi
.:"r:irrrj— i-:n•r~_\— r-ni -i-—— - "-,■■—■■■...................... .... .r— ^■■■^ —

48I. 195.
49 X, 191*
^ I . 195*
51X. 176,
521, 183-4.
531. 173-6. 179.

,

.

46
Because the situation o f objects is determined

021X7

by their relation to objects of the seme sense* all
visual objects are in the mind and hence are all
equidistant fram.any tangible object which exists
54

outside the mind, or rather they are at no distance#.
Ch> % g u h ©

Visual and tangible figure have no necessary
connection and. are associated only through experience*
66
for* because figure Is the termination of magnitude
and

210

visible magnitude can of itself suggest a

tangible magnitude, no visible figure can of itself
suggest a tangible figure#
feel smooth#

What appears rough may

A picture of many colors gives only

one touch sensation# 5 *7

Moreover, in the first act

of vision -of one born blind and made to see, no
tangible thing could be identified or located by sight*
We can, of course, have no idea of abstract figure
69
separate f r o m visible or tangible magnitude**'
54

X# 130, 182, 105# Notice that Berkeley is still
speaking of an external tactual object* this is set
straight in the Principles* 1# 280#

5 5 I,

197*

5 6 I*

178*

5 7 1.

179*

58
I* 179* 181.
59

I, 190.
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Visible a n d Tangible Extension
Berkeley holds that there ts n o object coupon
to both touch and sight*2- la every body there are
two extensions ** the risible and the tangible.# 2
Furthermore there is no necessary connection between
risible and tangible extension*
(a)

Visible Extension Differs From Tangible

In the Oonsaomplaee Book Berkeley considers the
difference between tangible and risible extension in
a number of notes*

By extension he here refers to

the extension of body*

The distance or space between

bodies would be interpreted in terms of the extension
of a body sufficient to occupy the space in question*
Extension is a %ode of some tangible or sensible
quality according as it is- seen or felt# tl^

On this

ground we may distinguish between visible and tangible
extension# ~

1X, 177-8, 184, 190, 194*
2I. 62,

sI*
4

4*

I* 11*

Berkeley is apparently using the term “mode*
in the sense given It by locko*

48
Since visible extension Is proportional to
tangible extension and* like the latter* la
^encreated and diminished by part am the two are
5
commonly taken for the same#This confusion is
explained by the laws of the association of Ideas*

©

But the two extensions are entirely different* for
there are two sorts of bignessi first* the proportion
of one visual appearance to- other such appearances
given at the seme time* which is ^proportional to
angles* or if a surface* to segments of sphaerleal
surfaces** and second* tangible bigness*

Tf

Several reasons are given to show that the two
extensions are different s
Cl) There is no proportion for all men and at
S
all times between a visible and a tangible inch#
{2} If the two extensions were the same* then

one who had never seen M s limbs would know their
9
visual length*

Sl. 61,
6I. 75,
7I. 74,
SI» 61-2*
Q
01*

40

not bo imagined or

(3) ¥ialble extension »

conceived added to tangible extension and hence
they at*#' heterogeneous*
(4) 0a# may say ttoat an object viewed at a
distance seems as large as when -close although
the visual appearance Is mailer so it smxot he a
different M o d of extension that is referred to#**
(63

What is smooth to the touch may he othor**-

wia# to -the sight and vice versa** 8
(6 ) there is no necessary eomeotion between
visible and tangible Ideas*
tte) Ho Heeessary Connection Between. Visible and
tangible Extension
Severn% arguments are given to show that there
is no necessary connection between visible and tangible
extension#

ffee- principal ones -are thm following#

Cl) If our eyas had'a different range of vision
extending to tlay particlest the. touch would not be
coordinated with the visual sensation and no association
between the two could be set tip**®
q »tn i* m l i^ w . i *

102# eg *
11

I# 66*

12X. 77*
13X. 196.

f
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50
{ 2 ) Mot only might the associations between

visible and tangible ideas have been different from
what they are now, but lesser tangible ideas might
even conceivably have- been associated with greater
tangible ones*

For -example, even and or present

conditions, a small faint object is thought bigger
<14
than a large clear one,
(3) We do not perceive the tangible magnitude
of objects immediately by sight n o r do we perceive
their siso 'by the mediation of anything that- has a
15
necessary connection with them as already shown#
•f. Mf

*i £•

(4) We see only colors - nothing, external# ~
T h e r e f o r e t h e judgments of the magnitude of distant

objects arise from custom and not from a necessary
connection that has been observed between ideas of
sight and touch#

14

X# 151#

15I. 157,
16
If 166,
1 7 I,

156, 158,

17

51

(eJ tangible Extension Prior To Visible
1

hair© e a M that Berkeley makes tangible extent-

si021 prior to visible*

In the ^Theory of Vision he

states that this priority Is based on utility*-

things

that touch us may hurt and therefore we use our eyes to
'predict when an object will touch us and what Its
effect will be* and this prediction is based on con
stant association in experience*

Knowledge of the

tangible object is more useful and hence we attend
principally to tangible figure and magnitude*^
By applying this notion we may answer a question
which Berkeley propounds but does not answer explicitly:
^Sosr comes it that, visible and tangible qualities
being different* they yet have the same name to all
19
languageb w?
fheir association through utility would
provide a satisfactory answer in terms of this pragmatic
view*
Berkeley thinks that visible magnitude is -ex
tremely unreliable of itself#

it man ten feet away is

thought as great as a man five feet awayf which is
true for. tangible but not for visible extension*
IQ

2* 254-5,

19I. 60,
Vi?

'

a# *» fp#

I# 155*

on

*62

Indies and feet are stated lengths whereby -we measure
objects and estimate their magnitude#

We us© tangible

feet rather than visual because the latter are- hot
of any determined magnitude as shown by the fact that
at different distances they contain different numbers
of minima sensibliia, and consequently have a different
©^tension*

to Inch and a foot seen from different dis

tances have the same visible magnitude#^

A tangible

inch# however* Is so long and no l o n g e r . I t always
haa the same number of minima-.
Ihere are at least two difficulties here#

First*

what Berkeley calls a tangible foot is apparently
a complex idea got from a combination o f tactualand kinesthetic ideas*

Berkeley* of course* regards

it as an idea got from touch alone*

But we might

argue* as already suggested* that w© never feel the
object which we go up to and touch*

In fact* at a

distance w© know nothing about the tangible object
since it is unperceived*

Strictly speaking* it

would be ridiculous to refer to the tangible figure
or majpiltude of an object ten feet away*

S1X. 156.

po
I. 204.
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Second* it seems unreasonable tmt, simply
because the sense of sight is more versatile than
that of touch* we Should consider the former
secondary to the latter in importance*

From a

logical point of view* a quality dependent for its
existence on the relation of two sensed or sensory
ideas is equally dependent upon both and neither
is prior*

Consequently

1

may know the. extension of an

object directly neither by merely looking at It nor
by merely touching it*

It is. only by combining either

of these senses with the kinesthetic sense that X may
find its distance or its magnitude or figure*
For that matter', it is only because we have the
capacity of locomotion which- is revealed by kSn.esthesis* that the stationary visual, object has more than
one appearance*

If wo could not move we would think

that the visual object had only one appearance just as
we assume the tangible object to have ohly one*
However, a re&nalysls could be made easily,
giving kinesthesia a place in Berkeleyfs system*
It is thoroughly possible that in saying that tangible

54

extension and the tangible object are prior
Berkeley me ana only that, from a mechanical stand-*
)

point* they a r e m o re easily used as standards of
>j

measure*

T im e when Berkeley remarks that the true

object of geometry is tangible extension he explains
that men measure altogether by the application of
0*2

tangible extension to tangible extension* °
{&) Minima

Several references have been made to minima*,■
A summary of what Berkeley says of these units of

sensation will bring us to a consideration of the
character and composition of extension#
A minimum sensibile is that ttheroin there
are not contained distinguishable sensible parts*

04.

I n regard to extension there are two types of minima,

the T,M*t£*t? or minimum tan&ibile and the ffM*Y*n or
mintoum vfaihfls.* '

fho initials' alone.-are used to designate these
two different

X# _201-5*
24I, 10.
25I, xi.

ih the Commonplace Book.- and

A*

0» Fraser to M s notes interprets

as ^Matter

Tangible" and M.V. as "Hatter Visible",26

It

seems certain that Berkeley meant % t o £ m 8 and
not ^matter”♦ For instances he asks ^whether a
13*?.* he of any color

On© would hardly apeak of

% matter visible*1* Moreover the terms M*f * and
H*V** as well as M*S* which Fraser translates
as flatter Sensible”* are introduced by Berkeley
to notes which state that the M*B* is the basic
<50

element to an extension#'’
" ' As will be shown* the
ultimate elements of extension are said to
either risible or tangible*

Berkeley would object

strongly to the statement that extension is eom~
posed of %atter visible81*.
On© 13*3** according to Berkeley* is no
29
larger than another « the else is fixed*
All
M*V*1 s are of the same sise^®* even for different
SI
persons # and would be the seme In size even for a

56

person with microscopic eyes*®3 However, It is
impossible to compare the M*?* with the M*f*# even ■
though they are both %ext to nothing”, because they are
Ideas of different senses*.^5
Berkeley1© concern with the M*S* doubtless
arises from an attempt to analyse carefully lock©Vs
■"simple idea o f extension”, which Is a similar leadb
sensible point*

*£hie clone successfully, ideas of

different extensions could he built up from the repet
ition o f sensible points Just as was done by Locke*
Sometimes Berkeley refers to Hie M*S* as a
^nunotum senalbile” or sensible point*

A lino Is con

ceded by geometers to be made up of points*
are we to take points In the Buclidean sense?

'But
54

Berkeley holds that the true defIniflon of a point
is that it is an H*S**

V m of this definition, ho

elates, eliminates from- mathematics the absurdities
which arise because the senses are despised by
65
mathematicians*
For mathematicians speak of points

3 3 I,

41* 62.

5 4 I,

27*

W X. 64*

m

as unimaginable and this produces fallacies* for there
can be no- true-reasoning about thingd of which we haire
no idea*

ihis leads Berkeley to an attach, upon the

then' current .mathematical, notion of extension with
particular reference to infinitesimals*

m

Mathematical Space and Extension
The OanSiionclace Book and the essay Of. Infinites
contain a steep criticism of the notions of the
infinite divisibility and infinite largeness of
extension and space assumed by mathematics*

Berkeley

has two particular reasons for showing that there
are no infinitesimals*

First,, only by so doing

can he establish the existence of an ultimate,
indivisible unit from which the ideas of various
extensions and spaces may be built up*

Second, he

wishes to eliminate false notions of space and e»*
tension through mathematical misconceptions*.

%

a more general sense this becanes an attack on the
assumptions underlying Ilewtonlan mathematics, the
theory of fluxions, which made possible for Newton
the mathematical analysis which fomed an important
grouhd ©f M © physical theory*
(a)

Infinite Divisibility Impossible

Berkeley tells us that the M*F# and. the M*T* are
the least divisible parts of the extensions which they
compose*.

They are- the smallest things of which we

can have an idea because they are least peroepbibles

59

and hence are simple and have no parts#

Experience

teaches us that they exist 9 for they are the least
things we can see and feel#

Moreover* every argument

against the existence of such Indivisibles goes on
some false assumption*^
On the other 'hand* several arguments may be ad
duced to show that infinitesimals are Impossibles
(1) We have no ideas of infinitesimals and*
sine# to be is to be perceived* they do not exist*
therefore there can be no reasoning about them*

2

{ 2 ) Infinite divisibility supposes the external

existence of extension* but the latter is false and
hence the former also* no idea being external to the
mind* ^
(3)

Demonstrations of infinite divisibility

suppose the existence of abstract, extension - length
without breadth or invisible length*

The latter is an

absurd and false notion and hence the former is also*

1x. 13*
2

I* 9*
1* 69*
X, 59, 76.

A
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(4) ?*hat has an infinite number of parts
must he infinite#

If a given extension is infinitely

divisible it will be infinite in extent, which is a
S
contradiction#
(8) A minimum vislblle can not be made.up of
Infinitesimals for they are invisible and invisibles
are nothings and can not exist# ^
be a self-contradiction#
be made up of invisibles#.
(6)

Such a notion would

fhat which la visible can not
7

According- to the doctrine of infinite div

isibility a rose at an infinite distance would have
some smell*

fhls is absurd*3
(b)

Infinite hargeneas Impossible

Examination shows that infinite largeness, like
infinite divisibility, Is impossible because un
intelligible .and self-contradieboryi
{%) Our ideas of extension are neither way capable

of infinity, as anyone may try by examining the contents
€f
of his mind*'

6
I* 13.
7
1. 10*
8I. 57.
9I. 63.

( 2 ) ninfinite quantity n has no moaning*-

ihen

wo use the tern we mean either a finite quantity or
10
else nothing at all*
Magnitudes are- definite*
hut pure infinite space is indefinite and ahsurd,^
{3} Infinite space* even assumed as necessarily
existing* is not imaginable without motion and is
tp
thus limited and relative*
(4 )

M l absurdities produced by the notion of

infinite space are unnecessary* because if we abandon
the notion the absurdities disappear and the 'idea of
finite spaces and extensions will serve all the de
mands of reason and. utility*3^
In short* then* there can be no absolute space
or extension* because these supposed entities are
particularly- characterised by infinity of both sorts*
Absolute* infinite space* is impossible because .it
can not. be imagined* because it is self-contradictory,
and because its locus and its qualities are incompat
ible with both reason and experience-;#

Ihere is no

external* infinitely divisible* -and -infinitely large
space#

62

(o) Meaning of Infinite
In any ease, ^infiniteft Is an ambiguous tern,
and whatever determined meaning Is assigned to it
produces difficultlea*

For example:

tl) If by an infinite extension its m e m one too
small or too- great to comprehend, that is a con14

tradlction*
12 ) I f by an Infinite extension we mean one

consisting, of innumerable points,, that Is a contra**
diction, for points, lfthof never so .many, may be
numbered'** ^
( B l wIf yon call infinite that web" is greater

than any assignable by another* then there may be
an infinite square, sphere, or any other figure*
which Is absurd*3-®
Blnoe we have no idea' of infinitesimals, our
t

♦

ideas of extension must be composed of minima«
either visible or tangible*

¥tfhe *1** & 111,1

& ****** &e# of time are to be cast away and neglected,
*
» 1*7
as so many noughts or nothings *
Extension would
be treated in similar fashion*

Visible extension,
IS
then, is ffa continuity of visible points** ■

14I. 15* 16*
151. 15*
16X, 9*
IV
X* 17.

18I* 63.

(d) Irrora of Abstract Mathematics
Berkeley attacks not only the existence of
mathematical absolute space and extension but shows
that mathematics as applied to finite, extensions
and spaces attributes false characteristics to
them*

Much confusion arises from the fact that

arithmetic and geometry discuss the relations of
number end figure before knowing the true nature of
IB
these objects*
Moreover* mathematicians* like
others* are deceived by the supposition that abstract*
general ideas are possible* and that these ideas are
copies of entities outside of and independent of
19
the mind*
As an abstract science arithmetic is silly*
Berkeley insists#

It is only Intelligible when

practical* when dealing with finite ideas applied
to particular things* for numbers are only names
and by themselves stand for nothing*

Unity * for

example* in the abstract la no Idea nor the name
of an idea but simply an empty worcU^®

In arithmetic

64
we regard not the tiling but only the signs#

21

ematics deals with signs and not with Ideas,

22

Math**
with

numbers which are mere names and represent no ideas#

33

It is a *dpeeulatlire'n study which has as its object
no intelligible things, no ideas, and which %akes
toots on purpose to untie them**

04

Ihose things

which pass for abstract truths and theorems hare
meaning only in so far as they are conversant with
25

particular, numerable things#
(e) Faults of Geometric Extension
Similarly, the lines of **purew geometry are
insensible and meaningless nonsense#

Since they are

insensible, we have no idea of them and hence can
26
not discuss them intelligibly#
Ihey are insensible
because they attempt to represent general and abstract
Ideas and such ideas have been shown to be impossible#
27
Hence much of the confusion In mathematics*

21I# 76,
22I* 50
25I#
24
I*
25
I*
26
X.
27
I*

47
19, 56*
326
14
7*

The object of geometry then is not pure space
01 * external

extension considered in the abstract*

ttOur ideas we call figure & extension* not images
of the figure and extension of matter| these (if
such there be) being infinitely divisible, those
2&
not b o * w
The proper object o f geometry is apace
or extension considered as particular and finite
and dependent upon the mind*

Considered as

applying to absolute apace and extension it is a
delusion* simply a system of names which refer to
nothing*

This, positivistie attitude doubtless

stems from lockeVs discussion of 'the meaning and
function of words*
Certain errors about the nature of extension
arise from the geometer1s assumption of the existence
of external objects* for the figures of geometry are
commonly assumed to exist outside the mind*

But it

has been shown that no idea exists outside* the mind
and hence lines can not exist outside as properties
30
of an external matter*

66
Because of this assumption* when arithmetic
is used in geometry* certain contradictions appear#
Mathematicians should recognise that geometry is
a %ixt mathematics” applying arithmetic and algebra
51
to points*
Berkeley Is here protesting against
the tendency of science to assume that the universe
is renderable completely in terms of an a priori
mathematical system*^
(f)

Errors Made By Geometers

The major error about extension that arises from
assuming the existence of external objects is that
of attributing: Infinite divisibility to finite extension*
While infinite divisibility is not expressly stated*
yet it is ^everywhere supposed* and thought to have
so inseparable and essential connexion with the- prin
ciples and demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians
never admit- it into doubt*
Mom if it can be shown that no finite extension

contains innumerable parts* something about the nature
of extension will be determined and* at the same time*

31I. 12, 47.
SS1, IS*
»*. 327,

m

certain contradictions in geometry will be cleared up#
Some of the errors referred to are* for example* the
following, which arise from an erroneous notion of
the object of geometry $
(X) that there are surds*

leaXXy there are none#

(2) That the diagonal of a square is incommen
surable with the side*

Actually this is not so al

though Berkeley expresses seme doubt about this when
he first mentions it#^s
(3) That two lines have a mean proportional#
This is not always so for it depends upon the number
36
of points in each line*
(4) The Pythagorean theorem*. This is false as
shown by the fact that all lines can not be divided
into equal parts*

¥Jh©ther a line may be so divided

depends on whether it contains ©n even number of
points*
(5) That a circle can not be squared*
33-.
1* 52*?
^S . 14.
3SI. 60, 78*9.
36
1. 14,
37I. 19, 79*80.

Particular

circles m m be squared if they contain the proper
58
number of points*
Berkeley gives no direct descrip
tion of how to square a circle but says that If one
can be squared arithmetically it is squared geometrl-59
eally*,
apparently he means that a circle made up
of a number of points equal to a perfect square could
easily be squared if we knew the- number of points*,
(6) fhat a finite line is infinitely divisible#
But geometry does not prove that this is possible*^®
Bow can a line composed of a definite number of points
bo divided to infinity?
All these errors come from assuming the Infinite
divisibility of finite extension#

Moreover* certain

direct contradictions come from the same assumption,
for example 5
(1)

Seme .geometers hold that a line may be divided

into infinitesimals and that these in turn may be
divided infinitely * infinitesimals of a second order*
If this were so, an inch would have an infinity of an

m
Ap

infinity of am infinity ©te* of partss*.(2)

Bam- hold that all inflnltestaalo below

the second order are nothing at all*

But they are then

obliged to hold that in soma aetee f%he square* cube*
or other power of a positive real root* should Itself
he nothing at ail1* which is absurd*
Cg) Finite Extension lot Infinitely- Mvfafbl©
lot oontent with falsely assigning infinite
divisibility to a non-existent l?mathsmatioal,T apace*
geometry erroneously supposed finite extensions to
he infinitely divisible* 1 have dealt with Berkeley'1©
denial of the possibility of infinite divisibility
in general*

that there Is no smh thing mm m part

infinitely amall or an infinite twmhm of parts
contained In any finite quantity

is shown by the

following arguments i
Cl) Brory particular finite exfeensim which, may
possibly he the object of thought is an idea existing
in the mind and only in. the stud* and each part of
the extension m e t be perceived for otherwise it
42
I* SSI*
4S1« 331.
44

X. 331-2.
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would have no existence in th© mlnd*^5

fhus it

follows that j
(A) If we ar© unable to perceive innumerable
parts in any finite extension# then it is certain
■4A
that they are not combined In it#
(3)

Since we do find that we are unable to

distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line#
surface, or solid, therefore no finite extension Is
infinitely divisible#^
( 2 ) If# by finite extension is meant something

different from a finite idea# then we do not know what
it can be#

But if the terms extension# parts# etc*

are taken in any sens© conceivable# that is# for
ideas# then to say %

finite quantity or extension,

consists of an infinite number of parts* is a
contradiction*
(3) People who believe in abstract ideas may
reasonably believe that extension in the abstract.
.
is infinitely divisible#^
45
* X* 327*8*
461. 327.
47I. 328.
48I, 328.

But we teve shown.

that abstract ideas arc inconceivable#
(4) People who believe that the objects of
sense exist outside the mind may# in virtue, thereof#
admit that a line an inch long may contain innumerable
50
parts really existing although too small to discern#
But we have shown that the objects of sense are in the
mind' alone#

^Infinite divisibility of' extension deep

suppose.external existence of extension^ but the
latter is false# ergo ye former also# n
i S ) If finite lines are. .infinitely divisible there

BP
can be no such thing, as a point#.'
In brief# it.is on the assumptions noted, in
points #5 and #4 that the arguments for infinite
divisibility of finite extension are based#.

‘These

having been proved false# the notion is untenable#
(h) How the Geometers Fall Into Error
Berkeley gives an explanation of how it cornea
about that geometers mistake the number of points
in a line for an infinite number#

When a line is

used to represent a much longer extension and is

72
spoken of as containing, for example* a thousand parts
although it really contains much fewer* {as in drawing
a scale diagram) people forget to retain the distinction
and easily slide into the belief that the particular
line really has a thousand p a r t s * t h e r e b y they get
the notion that* since a irery short line may have a
thousand parts* it may e v e n have an infinite number*
But the only true use for ^universal** ideas in geom
etry fts when a particular line stands, for innumerable
others of different sisea* which are considered
64
abstracted from their magnitude*
So to -consider
a theorem as universal we must speak of the line
on paper as containing parts which it actually does
not contain#

But we can. not imagine an inch itself

being infinitely divisible or consisting of a thousand
parts. ^

Whs line simply stands for the idea of a

larger line*

Whereas for a line to be infinitely

divisible It must be infinitely great*

55I. 3S0-1.
331*
55I. 330
561. 330*

TO

(£> How Geometry Is Nevertheless Practical
How if the geometers have been involved in
error and -deceived in their notion of the true
object of geometry and the Infinite divisibility
of extension* how is it that they have made such
practical progress?

? M s # says Berkeley* is be

cause whatever in geometry is useful remains true
when extensions are considered as containing only
Berkeley promises to

a finite number of parts*

demonstrate this in detail in another place but
57

fails to do so*

There he is to show how to

measure lines without assuming the infinite divisi
bility of finite extension*

Perhaps the method

of measure he proposes (and we may take measure here
to m e m all gome trie operations00) is that indicated
in the Commonplace Bopk*.

Shat is* to measure lines

we have simply to count the minima which compose
59
them*
*

According to Berkeley geometers only appear
to use infinitesimals anyway*

They seem by the use of

Fraser thinks that Berkeley Is referring to fart 11
of the ffrinelnlea*. which never appeared*
58 '
X* 48*
59I, 332.

Infinitesimals to solve problems that would be
otherwise insoluble*

But not only is it unnecessary

to use infinit©slmls .in solving these problems,
but it is even impossible to solve them to this
maimer*

60

Even to. fluxions we neither conceive nor need
to conceive toftoltesimals*

W© have seen that It is

impossible to conceive or. imagine anything leas
than a minimum ssnalbile*^

Hence accuracy beyond

minima la a waste because it is meaningless*^

to

infinite of even the first degree is a ^mere nothing1*
1/iOOOth o f an inch is nothing because it.represents
nothing but, when an inch is used to represent a mile
then l/1000th of an inch represents 1/lOOOth of a
mile which is an imaginable idea and hence is not
64
nonsense*
When we speak of infinite quantities
/2C

we mean either finite ones or else nothing at all*

€QI, 352.

61

„„„

1. 332*

6SI. 77*

Actually geometers do not consider lines as
mere distances abstract from other .qualities'as la
shorn by their use of curved lines*^

Curves are

incomprehensible unless we allow lines to bemad©
tip of finite points for the attempt of geometers
to consider'curves'as polygons is nonsense#

-3?he

lines of geometry then are really made up of irreducible
points, minima aenalbllia* and the real business
of geoemtry is simply demonstrating that lines
are' equal or unequal and hence are to be called by
the same or different names*^

fhe significance of

the science depends upon the meaning of equality .
and mathematicians have avoided defining .this term*

69

*Th©y say* nQUa© eongrmmt sunt ae<paiia% but this is
meaningless and unintelligible unless ^equal11.is
defined* and a .system admitting the existence of
Infinitesimals can not make a satisfactory definition*
And no word should b© used unless it represents an
71
idea*

70

But 4t lines are made up of points* as we have shown*
then we may readily define equal lines as ones eon*72
taining the same number of points*
and equal triangles
as ones containing the same number of points or minima
*7*%
senslbilla*'
Mathematical extension and space* then, are
fictions because they assume the existence of
external and abstract' space and extension and be
cause they assume that finite extensions and spaces
are infinitely divisible* all of which is .impossible*

77

fhe latere of Space and J^tenoloai
la) fte Mea of Bj&enaion
Berkeley's extension ia built up- by the repoti*
■
3.

ti< m o f simple Maas of extension* that ia# minima*

without which there can be no Mam of a stated length#

2

Intension consists of a fV&rl©ty of hom^emal thoughts
co-existing without m i x t u r e o r *the collection or
distinct coexistence of
Mens of sight and touch*

that -is* peresp**
fisrnl extension

soots

to

he the- oo^eacistanoe of colors |minte« points of
jjs

color) in the mind*,

factual extension* the trm

extension of bodies* ia a ^continuity of solid porta*
and space la a *emblmlty of m a o L M p a r t s A
ninteum point, betas ® stable idea, is Indescribable.7

Boro is another algnlficanf similarity between Berkel#y#s
theory and that of Looks#

%lm 81.
2
I. 64.
5I. 70*
4I* 83*
°I, 70.
0
I# 63
I* 37, 63, 67-8, 71.

78

But in the Cexmnonpiaee Book there is some suggestion
that extension is not a simple M e a because it con
tains three several ideas - length., breadth* and
solidity.®
nevertheless* even a given extension seems to
he a simple idea because it is unique and qualitatively
different freest a simple collection of minima# ^'hus
Magnitude taken for co-exist ©nee and succession ia
o
not all divisible* tout is a simple idea#11 Apparently*
however* in this passage* Berkeley Is referring to the
magnitude of empty or absolute space and not that of
particular finite extensions#

fhat toeing the case*

this notion of th© simplicity of magnitude when con
sidered in one aspect* may he Introduced to- suggest
that absolute space could not toe divisible and hence
would toe useless to the role commonly assigned to it that of providing- a background of reference for
finite extensions#

the context of the reference to

quest ion suggests this#

8I, 65,
9I. 67,
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Elsewhere Berkeley definitely makes extension
a simple idea because * like ^power11 and Tfr©(l% it
10

includes nno parts or relations1**

Here be is

evidently referring to the minima which compose an
extension *■ locke1s simple ideas of extension#
fjhab Berkeley sees difficulty in considering'
an extension as a simple collection of parts is
hinted in several other passages#

l?w©lv© inches

is not the same idea as a foot hut it is like a foot
because they both contain the seme number of points#^*
Apparently an extension is something more than the
repetition of a number of points*

It is unlikely

that Berkeley would consider mere difference in name
a legitimate .ground for distinction*

Moreover* % e

may think of a circle* or have its idea in our mind*
without thinking of points*-**## -whereas it should
seam the idea of a circle is not mad© up of the
ideas of points1*#^

this disagrees with Berkeley* a

theory of the Impossibility of abstraction or else
with the theory that an extension is composed of points#

10I» 67*
l:LI. 25*
IS
"J*

M

Bhoartainby la algo

bm ptbbbbC

in tlm mnsnewored

question "whether I4e&@ &t eatensicm are oede u p pg

other ideas* o*g* the ties of a foot made
General fdaas of on inolirr* ^

up of

Finally# Berkeley

motes that wtbo Maas w# t e w by a itmaceaslw* curious
inspection of ye minute parts of a plain do not seem
to mate tip the extension of that plain vlcwf& & com**
3.4

sidorfd all. together**

to interesting suggestion which

If further developed* might clear n p tfcit
ambiguity ia the notion there isay b# r?two kinds of
visible extension ~ m m perceiv’d by a confused view*
the otter by

0

distinct successive direction of the

optlqmo oils to each p o i n t C ^ f a r t r a a t o l y Bortelof
confines htesolf to the more flotation of this possibility
St would m m that Berkeley gave eaneldorable
thought to b revision of teete10 analysis of extension
into ydnim cm simple ideas tot failed to find a
tterengbly satisfactory revision*

It is worth

noting that moat of Berteleyte unsolved objections
arc the sort that would be mode by am adherent of
the dosteit theory of perception*

81

Berkeley notes another difficulty in regard to
minima in the ffommoneiaee Book and nowhere attempts
to solve it*

What color is a minimum?

Can a

16

minimum he green? ' fh© difficulty here would he
that green m s considered to he a combination of
blue and yellow so that a green minimum would have
different parts, some blue and some yellow#

if this

were so then it could not he a minimum for the
separate parts which were distinguishable would
he minima# Of course modem knowledge of the composition
of colors Indicates, that the real difficulty would he
to explain how w© can see yellow since it Is a
combination of red and green whereas green Is a
primary color and hence simple*

1*?

How we can see

green might he satisfactorily explained hut any color
mad© up of the combination of two colors would present
the original difficulty*
mother question suggested hut not answered is
"whether a M*V* he of any color? a M#T* of any
18

tangible quality?r

A more Interesting point

16I* 17.
17The Ladd-Frsnklin theory would, of course, make yellow

also a primary visual response*
18X, 11.
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not cleared

up

ia "whether a M*V« or a 11*1?'* he extended"*,

It la clear that a M*S* can not he a continuity of
part a for'the parts would he invisible and that
which ia visible can not he made up of Invisible
20
things* " &a Berkeley seems to he patterning M s
idea of extension, after Locke the answer to this
probably would be that a M*S* is to itself the primary

idea of extension and anything composed of M*S*fs
would have extension*- whereas to ask whether the
M«S* itself has extension would be meaningless*
However* these details are simply mentioned to the
Commonplace Book and are not discussed elsewhere*
thus we are left with the fact that Berkeley1a
theory of extension as expressly stated is similar
to Locke1a to that extensions are made up of in
describable minima of sight or touch*
Is extension itself?

But what

We do not know the meaning

of such words according to Berkeley* ^

If a given

extension is-made up of points do these points
have extension?
.
r..
|
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If not* then the aggregate contains
r, ■
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X9

as
something which the parts lack*
minima should he divisible#
extension?^2

if so, then the

Do minima. then,have

Berkeley does not answer this directly

but he does note that simple ideas are incommunicable*

23

ffl?hat being so, It aeems reasonable to suppose that
Berkeley would consider that the essence of ex
tension, that which the minima possess by virtue of
which they compose extensions, ia something not sus
ceptible of discussion*

Bike time, ftSi non rogas

■pA

Intelligo"*

We know the simple idea of extension

directly and intuitively but we can not describe it*
(b) All Space is Belatlv©
I have discussed Berkeley *s attack on the not ion
that absolute apace is necessary as a place for
absolute motion*

In De Motu it is shown that

there can be no absolute space because the tern
means nothing*

Space without bodies existing would

not be extended for apace without parts would not
be extended and it can only have parts assigned to
it in relation to body* . distance then becomes meaningless

2 2 J,

p*z

62

I* 37, 68, 71#
I. 71.

m

unless it la tavern me that which w o n M be occupied
by a body of a certain sit© and exposed of a
oe#ta!& aun&er of nJteinm. Bemalbtila*

Without

either parts or todies there e ouM be n o space
os

m m anything mm®pt %ao uoifpm nothing**

to&gteo ail todies to the universe to I»fi toon
destroyed and what rem&toa is sailed absolute apace
which la without relations or ■diettoptishtog character*
Isitos# la attribute® -can he asslgnaa to It#

mm

its so-called extension can neither ho divided nor
measured*

It finds no place to the senses* or in

tho toaglsmbion # or In the intellect*

la short, it

i® every way unrealizable in experience, so it is
a mars w i denoting nothing#1^
Berkeley has attacked ffewton.1® scientific object
in so far as that 1© supposed to bo an absolute
matter assisting in- absolute space sad exhibiting
absolute motion*

newton h S m m i t admitted that we ere

limited to knowledge of objects relative to otur
senses sad moving only relatively to relative space,
25t
*# w *
86I* 820,
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but lie assumed* apparently gratuitously (if we except
M s proof of absolute motion), that the object with
which science' deals, directly is in some sense a
veridical representation of -an absolute mass moving
against a background of absolute space*
Berkeley eliminates this world of material and
special absolutes showing that the relation of
our sensations to each other Is their only measure
and reference*

Observation gives us no knowledge

of any external or absolute entity*

Bewton postulates

a mind observing empirical objects with which science
deals directly but which refer to an absolute and
unseen scientific object*

Berkeley reduces this

system to embrace only mind containing ideas whose
only known or Intelligible relation Is with each other*
Space then, for Berkeley, is relative to finite
extension and finite extension Is dependent upon
mind*

f?$hat may be the extension, figure, and motion

of anything really or absolutely, or In itself, it Is
impossible to know, but only the proportion or
relation they bear to our -senses* **fhlngs remaining
the,same, our ideas vary***All this scepticism
follows from our supposing a difference between things
and ideas* #*TtS*7

27I* 306,

(©) Summary of Bature of Space and Extension
In his discussion of space and extension
Berkeley has attempted to show that space is only
to be interpreted In terms of the extension of body
and Is hence relative, that both space and extension
depend for their existence on the mind and therefore
In a second sense have no absolute existence, that
they do not exist external to. the mind or abstract
from sensible qualities, that they do not possess the
characteristic of Infinite divisibility commonly
attributed to them by mathematics, and that their
ultimate constituents are simple Ideas of extension
and space which are got directly from the senses as
minima sens lbilia and which are not susceptible of
•analysis or definition*
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God and Space
As previously mentioned# It is necessary to
consider the possibility that in' Berkeley *s system
space and extension may exist external to and In
dependent of human minds through their being per
ceived in some other mind such as that of God*
X will deal first with the discussion of this- point
In the earlier writings and then with the treatment
of the subject found 'in Slrla#
(a) God and Space in the Earlier Writings
2a the foregoing discussion Berkeley seems to
have been denying the existence of- a world of
absolutes#

Actually moat of the arguments are directed

against the possibility of human knowledge of such
a world#

2& fact, in, certain passages# 'Berkeley seems

to speak as though absolutes really did exist#

For

example# he states that ^things perceived by sense
may be termed external* with regard to their origin;
In that they are not generated from within by the mind
itself# but are imprinted by a Spirit distinct from
that which perceives them#
•'-‘-‘- - h i " n r i.iti r r - r . T- t —
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admission that our sensations may have an external
archetype in another mind*

Indeed* Berkeley1s proof

of the existence of tod depends upon certain ideas
being introduced into our' minds by tod for our
knowledge of other spirits comes only from fftheir
operations or the ideas excited by them In us*.2
How the archetypes of our sensations could exist
only in some other mlnd^ and Berkeley states that
^whether there are such ideas in the mind of tod and
whether they may he called by the name of Matter* 1
will not dispute*

But 1 obiact to the notion of an

unthinking substance as the support of extension**4
But* following Berkeley1a reasoning* todfs ideas
must be inert and unthinking like our own- and it could
well he that our ideas* or seme of them* are copies
of tod'1a Ideas*

fhua the ideas of space and extension

entertained by God could constitute a system of objects
which* although dependent for their existence upon tod1a
mind* could serve as patterns for our human ideas of
space- and extension*.

Berkeley even tells us that

the visual and tactual -signs of space and extension

2x. 312*
3I, 312.

4I. 300.
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V

are nt h o language of nature addressed to us by Grodrt.8
External space# absolute in that it is independent -of ’human
minds* might exist In the mind of ®od*®
There are serious objections to this interpret**
stion*

Certain of Berkeley1s -arguments against

■absolute- and external space are cm purely rational
grounds#

For example* infinite divisibility* which

seems to be considered, an essential characteristic
of -absolute space*. Is held to be self-centra&letory*
How'Berkeley has elsewhere stated that It Is not
possible even for an, infinite mind to reconcile
7
contradictory ideas#
This should, effectively pre
clude the possibility of G-odfs ideas of space being
of a character to 'fulfill the requirements demanded,
of absolute space by science#

If infinite divisibility

is self-contradictory^ then* even though we make ^od?B
ideas of space absolute* those ideas will not include
Infinite divisibility and the calculus Is applicable
to nothing#

On. the other hand* Berkeley remarks

casually that infinite as applied to Ood means something

%*

200*

6
I* 170#
7

X* 330#

other than when applied-to men*®

it even *rseems* *#**

that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects
9
see more m*v*fa at once” than we do#
However,
this does not state clearly that Ood sees an infinite
number of M#V* *s or that God has an idea of infinite
space or extension*'
Berkeley remarks several times that we must
not attribute extension or space to God for fear
of identifying him with these supposed entities*
Such a notion would he highly dangerous, according
to Berkeley, because space is inert and God Is pure
activity**0

More, locke, Hobbes, Spinoza, and

Haphson are severly criticised for associating
11
God with extension* ’ %ace and extension are
dangerous attributes*

One reason for denying ex

ternality to space is that then either God would
12
have a rival or else be extended*
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{b} Bod and Spaa© in Siria
Birip was first published in 17449 some twentythree years after the ilatest of the other works
discussed* and shows a new development in. Berkeley1s
theory#

Here Bod1a Ideas are spelled with the cap

ital and are strongly Platonic since they are said
to he wthe most real beings, intellectual and un
changeable^ and therefore more real than the fleet
ing* transient objects of sense which, wanting
stability, can not be subjects of science* much less
of intellectual knowledge1
Being, so far as Bod1© Ideas are concerned,
apparently means intelligibility14* but Berkeley
does not indicate of what this intelligibility is
to—consist#— Moreover*r-th©re-is-the~suggestlw that-1
we may have

sot ©

notion, however vague, of Bod1a

Ideas for it is stated that the best human Intellect
can by great exertion *&©&£& some imperfect glimpse
of the Divine Ideas,, abstracted from all things
corporeal, sensible and imaginable#
13

III, 286

14
III. 285
XXX* 286#
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Just aa to the Platonic system there ore two
worlds, >so that If one carefully analyses and inquires
and ^ascends fram the sensible world, ■and beholds things
to a new light and a new order, he will then change
his system* and perceive that, what he took for
substances and causes are but fleeting shadows? that
Mind contains all, and is to all created beings the
source -of unity and Identity, harmony and order,
existence and stability#
We have no definite statement that God has Ideas
of space and time but the order of our spatial and
temporal Ideas must be a reflection of the divine
order which is beyond our intellects*

Such a system
Ki

leaves room for the existence of some sort of a
\

space which, if not Independent of ntad, is at least
Independent of human minds, and which bears the same
relation to our Ideas of apace that the Bewtonlan
absolutes bear to the objects of sense#
Bhfortunctely, Berkeley does not fully develop
this aspect of his theory to Girls and we are left
without the possibility of definite conclusions*

16m ,
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